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Footnotes
Editor’s Note: This article was initially submitted as part of a writing
competition for law students sponsored by the International Associa-
tion of LGBT Judges. Saltry’s entry won first place and was then sub-
mitted to Court Review for publication consideration.
1. “[T]ipstaff. A court crier. The name derives from the crier’s former
practice of holding a staff tipped with silver as a badge of office.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
2. Much of the analysis in this paper is geared toward sexual orien-
tation. While issues surrounding gender identity and jury service
would make for equally important reading, that discussion is
omitted here.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERI-
CAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 8 (1988).
6. See In Penn’s Case, 6 Howell’s St. Trials 951 (1670); id. at 9-10. See
also In Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1671).
7. Google Translate, https://translate.google.com/#en/fr/See,
https://translate.google.com/#en/fr/Say.
8. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 195 (1969).
Friday mornings in the Philadelphia Court of CommonPleas are unofficially designated as civil-jury days. Thevast majority of jury panels leaving the Juanita Kidd Stout
Center for Criminal Justice and heading over to City Hall on
Friday mornings are listed for civil cases—anything from
motor-vehicle accidents and contract disputes to complex
medical-malpractice and products-liability cases. These pan-
elists—not always bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, though more
often than not awake and attentive—are Philadelphians of all
stripes. They come from all corners of the city and are, for the
most part, pleasant folks. My job as judge’s tipstaff1 is to work
with these jurors by assisting the court and the litigants select-
ing juries and managing the courtroom. In my time at City
Hall, I have empanelled nearly 100 civil juries and as a result
can occasionally predict which side will strike which juror in
which order. This rarely happens, but after a few automobile-
accident cases, you get a feel for the types of experience or
beliefs that might bias a juror to a particular set of facts. As
prospective jurors answer the court’s questions, one may rea-
sonably characterize their answers as proxies for bias, and they
include such things as familiarity with claims investigation,
prior lawsuits, personal feelings regarding money-damage
awards, and the like. Using a juror’s stated experiences or
beliefs as a proxy for bias are permissible bases for excusing
that juror from serving on the jury by exercising a peremptory
challenge. 
But should litigants be permitted to exercise peremptory
challenges to prevent otherwise qualified people from serving
on a jury solely because of their sexual orientation?2 While
many argue that sexual orientation should never be a proxy for
bias, the law has yet to align itself with this view. A juror’s right
to serve free of discrimination based upon sexual orientation is
a developing concept, and while courts have rushed to secure
equal protection to same-sex couples seeking civil marriage
following the landmark U.S. v. Windsor3 decision, courts have
been less fleet-footed in securing similar protection for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) jurors. As of this writ-
ing, the Supreme Court has yet to decide on a standard of
review for evaluating equal-protection claims based on sexual
orientation, let alone the permissibility of exercising peremp-
tory challenges on that basis.
This paper discusses aspects of both the civil and criminal
court systems beginning in part I, which describes the voir dire
process generally—its background, purpose, and scope—as
well as an overview of the mechanics governing the process.
Part II highlights what limitations exist on the use of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude jurors based on their race and gen-
der. Part III covers current law regarding issues of sexual ori-
entation and peremptory challenges. Part IV discusses some of
the practical considerations at play regarding issues of sexual
orientation that manifest during voir dire as well as evaluating
several alternatives to the use of peremptory challenges. The
paper concludes by asking whether sexual orientation should
be protected under the line of cases stemming from Batson v.
Kentucky, arguing that sexual orientation deserves the protec-
tions of heightened scrutiny and the protections afforded
under Batson.4 Throughout the paper, intermingled with tradi-
tional citations, I have provided personal anecdotes that may
offer insight into the practical effects of the legal and policy
issues described. This commentary is not offered as expert
knowledge, and it is included solely for the benefit and enter-
tainment of the reader.
I. VOIR DIRE: THE PROCESS
The jury system originated in England sometime in the
twelfth century.5 Beginning as a rubberstamp for the king’s
wishes, juries gradually developed independence in decision
making over the succeeding centuries.6 The jury-selection
process known as “voir dire”—from the French words “to see”
and “to say,”7 often translated to mean “to speak the truth”8—
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9. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 22-23 (1986).
10. Id. at 21-44.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968). 
12. Id. at §§ 1861-62.
13. Dean A. Stowers, Note, Juror Bias Undiscovered During Voir Dire:
Legal Standards for Reviewing Claims of a Denial of the Constitu-
tional Rights to an Impartial Jury, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 201, 202 (1989-
90).
14. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(“The trial judge exercises substantial control over voir dire in the
federal system. . . . The judge determines the range of information
that may be discovered about a prospective juror, and so affects
the exercise of both challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges. . . . The judge oversees the exclusion of jurors for cause,
in this way determining which jurors remain eligible for the exer-
cise of peremptory strikes.”).
15. See Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.10 (2013) (“Jury service is an important
responsibility of citizenship, fundamental to our entire system of
justice. The courts cannot function unless citizens serve as jurors.
Thanks to jurors, our society resolves its disputes in a civilized
manner, in a courtroom where citizens decide upon a verdict. . . .
Thank you for serving your country in this most important role.
We are about to select [insert number] jurors and [insert number]
alternate jurors to try a civil case.”).
16. Id. at § 1.40.
17. Id. at § 1.50.
18. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991) (holding that the
questioning of potential jurors in groups of four does not violate
Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury).
19. Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.10 (2013).
20. Paul N. Luvera, Truth or Consequences—Is Voir Dire Really a Waste
of Time?, 43 WASH. ST. B. NEWS., May 1989, at 11.
21. Nancy L. Alvarez, Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impar-
tial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
959, 961 (1982) (“A challenge for cause may be exercised when
counsel has reason to believe that a prospective juror will not be
able to view the evidence at trial in an impartial manner due to
some previous experience or some fixed attitude, such as an
admitted bias.”).
22. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause protects a defendant from jurors who are actually inca-
pable of rendering an impartial verdict”) and MICHAEL T. NIETZEL
& RONALD C. DILLEHAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN THE
COURTROOM 17-18 (1986) (providing examples of incompetency
to serve, including inability to speak or understand English, phys-
ical or mental disability, certain types of felony convictions, and
lack of U.S. citizenship or residence in the court’s jurisdiction).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) (not specifying a limit: “[a]ll chal-
lenges for cause . . . shall be determined by the court”).
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (setting the number of peremptory chal-
lenges available in a criminal case at 20 for capital cases, 6 for the
government with 10 for the defendant(s) in any other felony case
with a term of imprisonment longer than one year, and 3 per side
in a misdemeanor case where the crime is punishable by fine, one
year or less imprisonment, or both), FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b), and 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) (granting three peremptory challenges for
each side in civil case). 
saw its first American iteration as part of the Massachusetts
Jury Selection Law of 1760.9 That law allowed the questioning
of potential jurors until their names were formally printed as
part of the sheriff ’s jury list.10 As voir dire spread from New
England to the rest of the colonies and eventually the United
States, the process developed more structure. But two cen-
turies of common-law development created disparities in voir
dire practices and procedures between jurisdictions. So much
so that in 1968, Congress mandated uniform procedures for
the federal courts as part of the Jury Selection and Service
Act.11 The JSSA provides in part that “all citizens shall have
the opportunity to serve as jurors” and that “no citizen shall
be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror . . . on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or eco-
nomic status.”12
Contemporary voir dire is mostly a question-and-answer
session conducted by the court.13 The process is conducted
exclusively by the trial judge or court personnel, by the trial
judge with varying levels of participation from the attorneys,
or entirely by the attorneys. The trial judge has wide discre-
tion in how voir dire is conducted.14 Generally speaking, the
process begins when the venire is brought into the courtroom,
where it receives a formal welcome from the judge,15 an intro-
duction of the parties, lawyers, and potential witnesses, a brief
overview of the process, and a description of the case to be
decided.16 The jurors take an oath to tell the truth, and the
questioning begins.17 Questioning is usually, but not always,
directed at the venire rather than individual jurors, though at
times the process may include both methods of questioning.18
Questions asked first are of a gen-
eral nature, usually about per-
sonal information like age; back-
ground; marital, family, and
employment status; area of resi-
dence; education level; prior jury
service; experience with a lawsuit;
and ability to be fair and impar-
tial.19 As the questions progress,
they tend to focus more on the
specific circumstances of the case
in question, provided that each
question is limited in scope to
elicit whether a juror could be fair
and impartial.20
Once questioning is completed, the parties then have an
opportunity to exercise challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges. A challenge for cause may be asserted by either
party to exclude biased21 or incompetent jurors.22 Parties chal-
lenging a juror for cause must articulate their reason for the
challenge. The trial judge has wide discretion in deciding chal-
lenges for cause, and such challenges are theoretically unlim-
ited in number.23 Peremptory challenges are exercised by the
parties once all challenges for cause have been resolved and the
court is nearly ready to seat the jury. In most circumstances,
parties exercising them need not articulate a reason for the
challenge, and as creatures of statute, they are limited in num-
ber.24 Once all challenges have been exercised, the remaining
jurors are seated in the jury box, they are sworn in, and the
[T]wo centuries
of common-law
development
created 
disparities in
void dire 
practices and
procedures
between 
jurisdictions.
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25. Pa. SSJI (Civ), § 1.90, 1.110, 1.130 (2013).
26. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed”).
27. U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved”). 
28. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984). 
29. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985). 
30. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (“[T]he Court
has unambiguously declared that the American concept of the
jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968) (“[A]ll liti-
gants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right
to . . . petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of
the community in the district or division wherein the court con-
venes.”)
31. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (“[W]e impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are
not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, . . . but the
jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which
juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably rep-
resentative thereof.”)
32. Id.
33. Id. at 94.
34. Id. at 97.
35. Id.
36. Id..
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
38. Id. at 415 (“We conclude that a defendant in a criminal case can
raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by
the prosecution because of their race.”).
39. Id. at 415 (“[T]o say that the race of the defendant may be rele-
vant to discerning bias in some cases does not mean that it will be
a factor in others, for race prejudice stems from various causes
and may manifest itself in different forms.”).
40. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
41. Id. at 59 (“We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the
ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.”)
42. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
43. Id. at 129 (“[G]ender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality.”).
44. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622.
trial begins.25 Part II discusses the
limitations placed on the use of
peremptory challenges in greater
detail. 
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE
OF PEREMPTORIES
The Constitution mandates that
all criminal defendants receive a
public trial by an impartial jury26
and that all civil litigants receive
the same right to a jury trial.27 The
Supreme Court described an
impartial jury as having both indi-
vidual and group components. On
the individual level, the Court
stated that “a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court”28 and that the juror “will conscientiously apply the
law and find the facts.”29 On the group level, the Supreme
Court has determined that an impartial jury venire consists of
a fair cross-section of the community.30 This fair-cross-section
requirement adheres only to the composition of jury venires
and does not mandate the composition of petit juries.31
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to end the practice
of peremptory challenges exercised to discriminate against
jurors on the basis of race. In the landmark case Batson v. Ken-
tucky, the Court found that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges to strike black jurors violated the equal-protection
rights of those jurors excluded from the jury on the basis of
race.32 The Court articulated a three-part test to determine
whether a peremptory strike was motivated by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose. Batson’s first step requires a defendant
raising a challenge to make a prima facie showing that the gov-
ernment exercised its strikes in a pattern of discrimination. A
defendant may do this by demonstrating that they are “a mem-
ber of a cognizable racial group,” “that the prosecutor has exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire mem-
bers of the defendant’s race,” that the exercise was discrimina-
tory, and that “all of the relevant circumstances raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”33 If a
defendant establishes this prima facie case, step two shifts the
burden to the government, which must “come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.”34 The gov-
ernment does not, however, need to meet the same burden
necessary for establishing a challenge for cause.35 Step three
rests with the trial judge, who must consider all the relevant
circumstances and then “determine if the defendant has estab-
lished purposeful discrimination.”36 The analysis articulated in
Batson marked a historic departure from the traditionally “any-
thing goes” nature of the peremptory challenge. 
Following the Batson decision, the Court augmented its
reasoning to include members of one racial group to raise
third-party equal-protection claims on behalf of members of a
different racial group. In Powers v. Ohio,37 the Supreme Court
allowed a white defendant to assert the rights of black
venirepersons struck from the jury panel.38 Powers held that
the reverse of Batson is also true, that a prosecutor’s use of dis-
criminatory peremptory strikes raises the same due-process
claims for white and non-white defendants.39 Additionally,
Georgia v. McCollum40 required that criminal defendants
receive the same treatment regarding their discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges as their prosecutorial counter-
parts.41 Finally, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,42 the Supreme
Court extended the Batson inquiry to prevent gender discrim-
ination.43
Expanding upon Batson and Powers, the Court extended its
equal-protection arguments to civil cases.44 In Edmonson, the
Court found that a private litigant exercising a peremptory
The Court 
articulated a
three-part test 
to determine
whether a
peremptory
strike was 
motivated by a
racially 
discriminatory
purpose.
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45. Id.
46. Id. at 621-22.
47. Id. at 624 (“When a lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the
judge advises the juror he or she has been excused . . . . The gov-
ernment summons jurors, constrains their freedom of movement,
and subjects them to public scrutiny and examination. . . . By
enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court ‘has
not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige being the [alleged] discrim-
ination.’ Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S., at 725,
81 S. Ct., at 862. In so doing, the government has ‘create[d] the
legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct,’ National
Collegiate Athletic Assn., 488 U.S., at 192, 109 S. Ct., at 462, and
in a significant way has involved itself with invidious discrimina-
tion.”).
48. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), but see U.S. v.
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991). 
49. See Windsor, supra note 3.
50. OUT OF THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN
AMERICA (Jeffrey Dupre 1998).
51. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 813 (2002).
52. Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Perempto-
ries, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231, 245 (1998).
53. SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d
471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014).
54. 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
55. Id. at 170 (“A defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first
step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”).
56. 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a Bat-
son challenge on the merits).
57. Id. at 240-66.
strike on the basis of race was impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause.45 In reaching that conclusion, the Court
had to determine whether private litigants in a civil case could
be considered state actors for the purposes of equal-protection
analysis. In a six-to-three decision, the Court found that a
party’s right to exercise peremptory challenges emanated from
state authority—in this case, congressional statute—and that
without the material assistance of the government—“reliance
on governmental assistance and benefits, performing a tradi-
tional governmental function, and the injury caused was
aggravated by the incidents of governmental authority”46—a
civil litigant’s use of peremptory strikes constituted state
action.  The Court in Edmonson, as it has throughout the Bat-
son line of cases, emphasized how the gravity of the harm done
by excluding jurors based upon their race is magnified by the
court system’s material participation.47
While it appears that groups and classes of individuals sub-
ject to heightened degrees of scrutiny—religion, national ori-
gin, etc.—would eventually receive the protections of the Bat-
son analysis, the Supreme Court has declined to extend Bat-
son’s protections beyond race and gender. Lower courts have
issued differing rulings on these subjects,48 and it remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court will extend the Batson
analysis to other groups subject to heightened scrutiny. In light
of this, should sexual orientation—which is technically not
subjected to heightened-scrutiny review49—receive actual
heightened scrutiny and with it the added protections afforded
under Batson? Part III makes the case for heightened scrutiny
and analyzes current law with respect to sexual orientation and
peremptory challenges.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
There can be no question that members of the LGBT com-
munity have long suffered discrimination in our society—
either passively through lost opportunities in employment and
housing or actively through violence and intimidation.50 As
such, classifying the LGBT community as a “cognizable group”
for purposes of a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim
can be assumed accurate. However, identifying the extent of
LGBT representation in a given population and their subse-
quent representation on jury
venires is all but impossible given
the complexities of identifying
members of the community absent
their “coming out” to the court.51
Because of this, Sixth Amendment
claims are likely doomed to fail.52
Thus, the only practical opportu-
nity to protect members of the
LGBT community from being sys-
tematically excluded from jury ser-
vice exists during the peremptory-
challenge phase of voir dire. 
While the Batson inquiry is
essentially the same, the Supreme Court began strengthening the
protections afforded under Batson in 2005 by altering steps one
and three of the Batson test. Step one requires a party challenging
a peremptory strike to make a prima facie case that the strike was
motivated by racial prejudice. Step two shifts the burden to the
striking party to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
strike. Step three requires the court to determine whether the
party challenging the strike has shown deliberate discrimination
based on the record and the totality of the circumstances.53 Fol-
lowing the 2005 decision in Johnson v. California,54 the party in
step one need only raise an inference of discrimination.55 The
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required pre-Johnson
was inappropriate because it forced the party to persuade the
court in step one that there was impermissible discrimination
present based upon a preponderance of the circumstances; essen-
tially confusing steps one and three of the analysis. The court’s
review in step three was vastly expanded by Miller-El v. Dretke
(Miller-El II).56 In Miller-El II, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the difficulty of determining a discriminatory purpose based on
the exercise of peremptory strikes from the perspective of trial
courts. The Court also listed a series of factors helpful in “ferret-
ing out”57 discriminatory peremptory challenges, including con-
ducting statistical analysis of stricken jurors, conducting com-
parative analysis of all jurors, noting any contrasting questions
between jurors of different racial backgrounds, any use of a “jury
shuffle” by a trial court, and whether the particular court or juris-
[T]he Supreme
Court began
strengthening
the protections
afforded under
Batson in 2005
by altering
steps one and
three of the
Batson test.
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58. Id.
59. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 522 U.S. 472 (2008) (reversing the trial
court’s refusal to grant a Batson challenge because the trial record
showed no evidence that the trial court ever conducted a credibil-
ity analysis of the striking party’s proffered neutral reason); and
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (holding that the attempt to
set aside the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor did not
strike a juror for racially discriminatory purposes did not satisfy
the requirements for granting a writ of habeas corpus under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
60. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Windsor, supra note 3.
61. 421 F.3d 758 (2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1126 (2006).
62. Id. at 769.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 765.
65. Id. at 766.
66. Id. at 769.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Supra note 53.
69. Id. at 483 (“Windsor requires that when state action discriminates
on the basis of sexual orientation, we must examine its actual pur-
poses and carefully consider the resulting inequality to ensure that
our most fundamental institutions neither send nor reinforce mes-
sages of stigma or second-class status. In short, Windsor requires
heighted scrutiny. Our earlier cases applying rational basis review
to classifications based on sexual orientation cannot be reconciled
with Windsor. (Citation omitted.) Because we are bound by con-
trolling, higher authority, we now hold that Windsor’s heightened
scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.”). 
70. Id. at 475 (“[H]ow [would] we know—I mean, the evil of Batson
is not that one person of a given group is excluded, but that every-
one is. And there is no way for us to know who is gay and who
isn’t here, unless somebody happens to say something. There
would be no real way to analyze it.”).
71. Id.
72. Id.
diction has a history of system-
atically excluding jurors for
racially discriminatory rea-
sons.58 Finally, the Supreme
Court held that appellate courts
need not defer to the trial court’s
credibility determinations
where the record fails to offer
evidence of credibility.59 In other
words, trial courts are only
accorded deference in their step-
three determinations when evi-
dence of credibility exists in the record. The combined effect of
these decisions has resulted in an overall strengthening of the
Batson analysis.
Despite these improvements, a juror’s right to serve free of
discrimination based upon sexual orientation is still a devel-
oping concept. The Supreme Court has yet to decide on a stan-
dard of review for evaluating equal-protection claims based on
sexual orientation,60 let alone the permissibility of exercising
peremptory challenges against people because of their sexual
orientation. Ambiguity reigns among the lower courts as well,
as is best illustrated in the contrasting views of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
A. United States v. Blaylock61
Eugene Blaylock—a gay man—and five other defendants
were indicted on federal drug-trafficking charges stemming
from a routine traffic stop in 2002. During jury selection, Blay-
lock raised a Batson challenge following one of the govern-
ment’s peremptory strikes, asserting that the juror was improp-
erly struck because of his sexual orientation.62 At the time, the
district court denied the challenge, suggesting that Batson was
not applicable to sexual orientation and that even if it was,
Blaylock had not made a prima facie showing of intentional
discrimination.63 Following trial, the jury acquitted Blaylock
on several charges but found him guilty of “aiding and abetting
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine,”64 a
judgment that carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 120
months in prison plus five years’ supervised release.65 On
appeal, Blaylock again raised a Batson challenge to the govern-
ment’s peremptory strike. In a unanimous panel decision, the
Court of Appeals held that the Eighth Circuit did not recognize
sexual orientation as a Batson classification and went on to
question the constitutionality of extending Batson to sexual
orientation.66 Further, the court reasoned that even if Batson
covered sexual orientation, Blaylock’s challenge would have
failed because the government’s stated reason for the challenge
went beyond mere pretextual language.67 In other words, Blay-
lock’s challenge failed to satisfy Batson’s first step in raising an
inference of impermissible discrimination.
B. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories68
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor,
the Ninth Circuit held that heightened-scrutiny review applied
to equal-protection claims involving sexual orientation.69 This
case involved a contract dispute between two pharmaceutical
companies—SmithKline Beecham Corp. (GSK) and Abbott
Laboratories (Abbott)—regarding the licensing and pricing of
HIV medication. During jury selection, under questioning
from the federal district court judge, one of the jurors—“Juror
B”—revealed that he had friends with HIV, that he was taking
either a GSK or Abbott medication, and, through the repeated
use of masculine pronouns, that he had a male partner. The
trial judge also used masculine pronouns when inquiring
about Juror B’s partner. Abbott’s attorney asked Juror B a total
of five questions regarding the types of medication at issue in
the case. Once individual voir dire was completed, Abbott
exercised its first peremptory challenge against Juror B. GSK
immediately raised a Batson challenge. In the ensuing discus-
sion between the court and counsel, the judge raised three
issues with GSK’s motion, including (1) whether Batson
applies to civil cases; (2) whether Batson ever applies to sexual
orientation; and (3) how the court would practically identify
those members of the venire who might be gay.70 In response,
Abbott’s attorney stated that he had “no idea whether [Juror B]
is gay or not.”71 Subsequently, the judge allowed the strike.72
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit conducted a Batson analysis of
GSK’s claim that Abbott improperly excluded Juror B because
of his sexual orientation. The court found that GSK had estab-
Ambiguity reigns
among the lower
courts as well, as
is best illustrated
in the contrasting
views of the Eight
and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal.
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73. Id. at 478-79. First, the court noted that Juror B was the only
venireperson to publicly identify himself as gay. Second, relying on
the language in Powers, the court believed that because of the high
level of concern in the gay community about price increases of HIV
drugs, the “potential for relying on impermissible stereotypes in the
process of selecting jurors was ‘particularly acute’ in this case.” Id.
at 476-77 (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140). Third, the attorney for
Abbott either did not or could not articulate a justification for the
strike when given an opportunity by the court. Finally, the court
found that the explanations offered on appeal were “pretextual.”
74. Id. at 479. 
75. Id. at 478-79.
76. Id. at 479.
77. Witt v. Department of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)
(articulating a three-factor analysis for interpreting the Lawrence
decision: first, that Lawrence “did not consider the possible ratio-
nal bases for the law in question as required for rational basis
review”; second, that it “required that a legitimate state interest
justify the harm imposed by the Texas law”; and third, that it
“must have applied heightened scrutiny because it cited and relied
on heightened scrutiny cases”).
78. SmithKline, supra note 53,  at 483-84 (“Witt tells us how to inter-
pret Windsor. Under that analysis, we are required by Windsor to
apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual ori-
entation for purposes of equal protection. . . . Thus, there can no
longer be any question that gays and lesbians are no longer a
‘group or class of individuals normally subject to “rational basis”
review’” (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143).
79. Id. at 486 (“As illustrated by this case, permitting a strike based on
sexual orientation would send the false message that gays and les-
bians could not be trusted to reason fairly on issues of great import
to the community or the nation. Strikes based on preconceived
notions of the identities, preferences, and biases of gays and lesbians
reinforce and perpetuate these stereotypes. . . . The history of exclu-
sion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the per-
vasiveness of stereotypes about the group leads us to conclude that
Batson applies to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation.”).
80. Id. at 489.
81. Id. at 475.
82. Yoshino, supra note 51, at 837. 
83. Personal Anecdote: During voir dire in a relatively simple motor-
vehicle-accident case having nothing to do with sexual orienta-
tion, plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a painfully tone-deaf display of
questioning.  A male juror who presented as gay arrived in judge’s
chambers for questioning during individual voir dire. After
informing the court that he was engaged to another male, plain-
tiff’s counsel continually used feminine pronouns when referring
to the juror’s fiancé despite the juror’s disclosure that his partner
was male. The juror was later selected to serve and ended up being
chosen as foreperson of the jury, which unanimously found in
favor of the defendant. Whether the two facts are related is
unclear; however, it is interesting to note the coincidence. 
lished a prima facie case of discrimination,73 concluded that
“the record persuasively demonstrate[d] that Juror B was
struck because of his sexual orientation,”74 and found that
Abbott’s proffered neutral explanations were a pretext for pur-
poseful discrimination.75 Having concluded that GSK met the
burden for sustaining a Batson challenge, the court had to
decide whether Batson itself prohibited strikes based on sexual
orientation.76 Based on an earlier Ninth Circuit case interpret-
ing the decision in Lawrence,77 the court held that Windsor
required application of heightened scrutiny to equal-protec-
tion claims based upon sexual orientation.78 Upon these con-
clusions, the court established that Batson applies to peremp-
tory strikes based on sexual orientation79 then reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial.80
The divergent approaches taken to Batson challenges by the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits demonstrate the ambiguity among
the lower courts. As more and more individuals decide to come
out and publicly acknowledge their sexuality, the more issues
of sexual orientation will appear in court, either for litigants,
their attorneys, or jurors hearing their cases. Part IV discusses
some practical considerations at play when sexual orientation
is an issue in the courtroom as well as alternate approaches to
the current peremptory regime. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATE
APPROACHES IN EXERCISING PEREMPTORIES
A. Practical Considerations
In cases where sexual orientation becomes an issue, it seems
natural to inquire about prospective jurors’ attitudes toward
gays and lesbians, their experiences with the LGBT commu-
nity, and possibly even their sexual orientations in the interests
of empanelling an impartial jury. As the judge in SmithKline
succinctly asked, “[h]ow [would] we know . . . who’s gay and
who isn’t here, unless some-
body happens to say some-
thing.”81 Setting aside the
juror’s privacy considerations,
the most obvious solution—
directly asking jurors their sex-
ual orientation—might also
yield the worst results. First,
asking a direct question does
not guarantee a direct answer.
Any would-be inquisitors
would have to deal with the
challenge of gay covering,82
and even if that could be over-
come thanks to a juror’s pre-
sentation, there would be no way to affirmatively identify jury
panelists as LGBT short of a “friend of Dorothy” T-shirt, secret
decoder ring, or similar foolishness. 
Imagine, for a moment, a situation in which a juror’s sex-
ual orientation is in dispute for purposes of a Batson chal-
lenge. A plaintiff ’s attorney may raise a challenge following
the peremptory strike of a juror who “seemed to be gay.” In
the ensuing colloquy, the attorneys argue—presumably based
on appearance (stereotypes)—over the prospective juror’s sex-
ual orientation. The judge would then have to determine
whether the juror was actually gay or if the totality of the cir-
cumstances raised an inference that the juror might be gay.
Imagine that the judge granted a Batson challenge on the juror
suspected of being gay, only to offend the juror who disclosed
that he was happily married to a woman. In seeking to deter-
mine a prospective juror’s sexual orientation without offend-
ing that juror, a basic level of interpersonal intelligence could
yield the intended result.83 Asking indirect questions, such as
Setting aside the
juror’s privacy
considerations,
the most obvious
solution—directly
asking jurors 
their sexual 
orientation—might
also yield the
worst results.
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84. See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-15 (Ct. App. 1981)
(wherein the trial judge rejected defense counsel’s request to ask
jurors directly about their sexual orientations; all examples pro-
vided are actual questions used by White’s attorneys).
85. Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors
Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 243 (2011).
86. “The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
87. Young, supra note 85, at 264. 
88. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995).
89. Id. at 267.
90. Young, supra note 85, at 268.
91. People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1990).
92. Young, supra note 85, at 269.
whether the particular juror
has any gay friends or rela-
tives, is active in any LGBT
advocacy groups, has a room-
mate and what that room-
mate’s occupation is (phrased
as “his or her”) might elicit
enough information for an
interested party to draw an
inference that the prospective
juror identifies as LGBT.84 It
remains unclear whether
such questioning would be
permissible, and even if it
were, a reviewing court
might very well find a pretextual motive for a party’s peremp-
tory strike based on a cold record. These considerations
demonstrate the difficulty in inquiring about jurors’ sexual
orientation and further demonstrate why using sexual orien-
tation as a proxy for bias is an inappropriate use of the
peremptory challenge.
B. Alternate Approaches
Restricting or Banning the Use of Peremptory Challenges
Legislatures give and legislatures take away, and what
statute creates, statute may destroy. In an article chronicling
the shortcomings of voir dire,85 Kathryne Young discusses
three alternatives that possess their own appeal. The first finds
its basis in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in Batson, which
calls for a total elimination of the peremptory challenge86 by
arguing that peremptories are often based on an attorney’s
hunch or gut feeling and that “a thin line exists between a
stereotype and a hunch.”87 Further, echoing the Marshall con-
currence, the essential hurdle for an attorney exercising a
racially motivated peremptory strike is the creative hurdle nec-
essary to articulate a racially neutral basis for the strike. Justice
Marshall’s concern may be somewhat lessened by the more
recent developments in the law curtailing a trial-court’s iron-
clad discretion in making credibility determinations; however,
the door remains open for discriminatory use.  Another argu-
ment for eliminating peremptories suggests that peremptories
are superfluous if the system regulating challenges for cause
works as intended.88 For-cause challenges work as intended
when they exclude jurors incapable of impartiality or fairness,
thereby rendering the peremptory challenge unnecessary.
Despite these concerns, a total elimination of the peremptory
seems unlikely. Besides the difficulty in getting Congress and
the state legislatures to reverse centuries of legal precedent,
there is a fairness argument to be made for peremptories.
“Empirical evidence indicates that people are most likely to
perceive that a system is fair when they believe that the proce-
dures it follows are fair,”89 and the peremptory-challenge sys-
tem creates (at least the illusion of) fairness. 
Young proposes two additional methods of curtailing the
use of peremptories for discriminatory purposes by further
restricting the number of challenges allotted and by requiring
parties to give a reason for each peremptory challenge they
exercise.90 Her argument essentially suggests that a limited
number of peremptories would force the court to exercise more
for-cause challenges. This approach seems like a shortcut to
totally eliminating the peremptory altogether. For example,
the federal civil system permits parties only three strikes per
side. To reduce that number to one or two seems arbitrary
when the same level of resource commitment could completely
end the problem by completely ending peremptories. Her sec-
ond proposal has merit. By forcing the parties to articulate a
reason for each of their peremptory strikes, Young’s proposal
short-circuits the Batson challenge by assuming steps one and
two sua sponte and jumping right to step three (sort of): 
An example of the way this proposal might operate is
illustrated in the New York case People v. Green.91 There,
an attorney used a peremptory challenge against a deaf
juror. The trial judge asked about the reason for the
strike, and the attorney replied that it was because of the
juror’s deafness, not because of any doubt that the juror
would be able to communicate through a translator. The
court held that the peremptory challenge violated the
juror’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.
Even though people with disabilities are not a suspect
class, they receive rational [basis] review, and a person’s
disability bears no rational relation to her abilities to
serve as a juror.92
While every trial court might not react in the same way as
the one in Green, requiring parties to disclose their reasons for
exercising peremptories would go a long way in eliminating all
types of impermissible discrimination, including sexual orien-
tation.
Bifurcated Voir Dire
As was previously discussed, the Sixth Amendment requires
speedy, fair, and publicly accessible trials; therefore, all court
proceedings including voir dire need to be publicly accessible.
An effective way to remain within the letter and spirit of the
[R]equiring parties
to disclose their
reasons for 
exercising 
peremptories
would go a long
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all types of 
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93. Personal Anecdote: In my courtroom, the general/individual voir
dire process is simply a matter of respecting the privacy of the
venirepersons. Based on my experience, most people presenting
themselves for jury duty strive to be as truthful as possible (espe-
cially about not wanting to be there). For example, the judge usu-
ally explains that the questions are of a general nature so that the
court and the parties can get an idea of what the panel’s ideas are
on particular issues. This way, the court is not asking jurors to
reveal any personal information in the presence of total strangers.
94. As was the case with Juror B in SmithKline.
95. Personal Anecdote: In my experiences, jurors—when not wholly
confused—will answer the question they think is being asked.
The best example is one of analogy: where a question might ask
“would you mind if I borrowed your pencil?” the juror might
answer “yes,” meaning “you can borrow my pencil.” These dis-
crepancies between a juror’s answer and intended answer are
almost always resolved during individual voir dire.
96. Dale Larsen, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for
Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3
DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139 (2010).
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 160.
100. Id. (quoting Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Arbitrary Metrics in
Psychology, 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 27, 32 (2006)).
101. Larsen’s article omits this consideration.
law is to split voir dire into two components: general and indi-
vidual voir dire. During general voir dire, the court or attor-
neys ask a series of yes-or-no questions in open court in the
presence of the venire. Each juror has an opportunity to
answer without fear of revealing any deeply personal or private
information so publicly.93 Any personal or more probing ques-
tions requiring more than a yes or no are conducted in camera
in a more private setting with only the judge, attorneys, and
court reporter present. Proceedings conducted in camera,
while secluded, are still part of the public record and thus sus-
ceptible to public scrutiny, thereby fulfilling the dual goals of
juror privacy and public openness. Further, proceedings con-
ducted in camera provide the court an opportunity to preserve
some level of confidentiality in jurors’ responses by referring to
them by their juror number, initials, or a letter.94
Some have suggested an alternative method of soliciting pri-
vate information from jurors through the use of Supplemental
Jury Questionnaires (SJQs). While these devices are attractive
in the abstract, they present their own set of challenges. First,
jurors have to understand the questions being asked. It is easy
to overlook the level of familiarity legal practitioners have with
the mechanics of trial process. The questions asked, while
reflective of and sensitive to the law, are often times too com-
plex for a layperson’s understanding. Even those jurors with
the dubious benefit of having seen a police or legal procedural
television show are left puzzled by the questions presented on
the standard jury questionnaire created by an impartial court,
let alone those questions submitted by zealous advocates for
their clients.95
The Implicit Association Test
One scholar argues for the inclusion of a test that measures
prospective jurors’ cognitive responses to stimuli during the
jury-selection process. Attorney Dale Larsen, in a 2010 law
review article,96 asserted the novelty of including the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) during voir dire to measure the degree to
which potential jurors might be racially biased. Developed in the
late 1990s, the IAT measures a person’s response time to certain
stimuli, which its proponents claim measures the implicit atti-
tude (or implicit stereotype) of the subject. For example, the test
subject is asked to associate two pairings, often a black face and
a white face, with words like “good” and “bad.” The IAT then
measures how long—usually in milliseconds—it takes the test
subject to pair the words with the visual stimuli. The thinking
goes that the shorter the
response time, the lesser the
degree of bias. Larsen provides
an excellent explanation: “If
an examinee associates white
faces with positive words more
quickly than black faces, then
that examinee likely has a
closer implicit attitudinal
association between whites
and positive thoughts than
blacks and positive thoughts, thus, indicating an implicit bias in
favor of whites.”97
While this option seems relatively attractive given its quan-
titative measurements, research into IAT’s applicability outside
of the racial context remains unproven despite over 250 IAT-
related studies since 2006.98 The heaviest considerations
weighing against adoption of IAT—aside from non-racial
applicability—are those presented by IAT’s detractors, which
include the test’s cost and various equity considerations. First,
they assert that the test uses measurements with little real-
world value. The argument goes that the millisecond offers vir-
tually no indication of “actual attitudinal preference”99 and
that it is “dangerous . . . to examine a person’s IAT score and
‘imbue [those] values with meaning’ about the individual’s
implicit cognition.”100
Second, administering the IAT requires a significant invest-
ment of financial and professional resources in ensuring the
test is conducted properly and measuring jurors’ responses
accurately. To maintain impartiality in the proceedings, one
assumes that the court system must bear the burden of admin-
istering the test.101 Given the ever-present threat of budget cuts
and the pressing needs already thrust upon an overburdened
court system, it is highly unlikely that courts will squander
scarce resources on a system with limited applicability and
questionable accuracy in determining whether jurors are
implicitly biased on account of race, particularly when the
existing jury-selection process provides opportunities to ferret
out such bias.
The Group-Dynamics Model
Juries are groups of 8 to 12 people who, over the course of
a trial, become intimate (metaphorically) with each other and
then deliberate in secret. Voir dire is an individual examination
While 
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103. Id. at 575-76.
104. See Walks v. State, 167 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1936); McGuire v.
Richard Guthmann Transfer Co., 84 N.E. 723 (Ill. 1908).
105. Temperly v. Sarrington’s Admin., 293 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Ky.
1956); State v. Boyer, 112 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. 1938); State v.
Morgan, 73 P.2d 745, 747 (Wash. 1937).
106.  Luvera, supra note 20, at 11.
of total strangers in open court designed to elicit bias from jury
venirepersons. While these considerations are of paramount
importance during voir dire, juries—once selected—complete
their deliberations as a group in secret. Thus, considerations
into how the jury will operate—the jury’s group dynamics—
should factor into the selection process. One author102 sum-
marized the limitations of voir dire and the importance of see-
ing group dynamics this way: 
First, there is a difficulty in predicting the way in
which the jurors will react to one another. This may be
stated as an inquiry into the group’s basic assumptions.
The voir dire examination simply cannot provide enough
of the information necessary to assess jurors’ attitudes
outside of the scope of the issues at trial. The second
dilemma is the difficulty in predicting the power struc-
ture of the jury—what roles each individual will play.
This includes determining who will be leaders, who will
be strong dissenters, and who will sit idly by, contribut-
ing little to the deliberations. The effect of this inability
to predict either the basic assumptions or the group
power structure is that the lawyers have little control over
the work group—the aspect of deliberations focusing on
arriving at a verdict. The inevitability of this result sug-
gests that an extensive voir dire will not provide signifi-
cantly more insight into jury dynamics than a shorter,
more tailored inquiry. Belaboring the jury selection
process, therefore, has a high economic cost with few
social benefits.103
The Group Dynamics Approach offers a promising, innova-
tive approach to the jury-selection process; however, to date,
inquiries into how jurors may act in a group setting are either
prohibited104 or limited in scope.105 Ultimately, voir dire
should be strictly limited to discerning which jurors are inca-
pable of being impartial. Trying to win a given case during voir
dire is a fool’s errand,106 resulting in discriminatory behavior
that denies citizens their rights to serve as jurors. 
CONCLUSION
Sexual-orientation discrimination deserves heightened-
scrutiny analysis by the judiciary, and Batson should be
extended to sexual orientation where peremptory strikes are
exercised on that basis. First, staying true to the principles and
purpose of voir dire requires that litigants impanel fair and
impartial juries. Their use of peremptory challenges should
reflect legitimate concerns based on stated bases for bias—not
using stereotypes as proxies for that bias. The test articulated
in Batson provides an adequate net to ensnare the improper use
of stereotypes and innuendo as proxies for bias, and its protec-
tions should be extended to cover discrimination based upon
sexual orientation. Given the history of discrimination and
violence perpetrated against LGBT individuals, the community
warrants the protections afforded under Batson. While practi-
cal considerations may weigh against the inclusion of sexual
orientation as a protected characteristic under Batson, the
resulting harm would leave gays and lesbians excluded from
this country’s most cherished public institution: service on the
petit jury. The ruling in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories is a promising development in this area, and one
hopes that the Supreme Court resolves the discrepancy among
the circuits in favor of a more perfect, more inclusive union.
Until then, courts must strive to improve their voir dire proce-
dures to protect the rights of all who enter their courtrooms—
regardless of who they are or who they love.
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